How will Iran respond to Israel’s attack on its Damascus consulate? | Israel War on Gaza News

Iran has vowed retaliation for an Israeli attack on its consulate in Damascus final Monday.

The strike was a part of a sample of escalated Israeli attacks in Syria for the reason that eruption of the Gaza battle final October. These assaults have usually focused warehouses, vans, and airports, and Israel’s declared intention for them is degrading Iran’s transnational provide community for the Lebanese group Hezbollah.

Monday’s attack was completely different, nevertheless, in that it struck a diplomatic facility – instantly difficult Iran’s sovereignty – and killed senior leaders within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Essentially the most high-profile casualty was Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a veteran commander who led the IRGC overseas operations wing, the Quds Drive, in Syria and Lebanon.

How will Iran reply? Because it seems, Tehran has a variety of choices – however none of them are superb.

Allies and energy politics

A significant participant in Center East politics, Iran typically initiatives its energy by means of a community of ideologically aligned allies and non-state teams – a community that types itself the “Axis of Resistance”.

These teams embody the Houthis of Yemen, Hamas of Palestine, Hezbollah of Lebanon, and Shia militia factions like Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, plus Bashar al-Assad’s authorities in Syria.

The actors fall on a spectrum starting from hardcore IRGC loyalists and proxies, like the 2 Hezbollahs, to autonomous however usually dependent companions and allies of Tehran, like Hamas, the Houthis, and the al-Assad regime.

Collectively, they profit from Iranian help whereas their actions assist Iran preserve deniability and preserve its conflicts with Israel, america, and Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia at arm’s size.

In 2020, nevertheless, Iran took the bizarre step of responding to the US assassination of the Quds Drive chief Qassem Soleimani – which was itself unprecedented – by staging a direct assault on US forces, launching a barrage of ballistic missiles on the Ain al-Assad base in Iraq.

US troopers on the base have been injured however none have been killed, largely as a result of that they had acquired warning from the Iraqi authorities.

It was a formidable demonstration of Iranian missile expertise, however underwhelming as a retaliatory motion.

Iranian leaders continued to voice imprecise threats about extra future retaliation and helped Iraqi militias harass US forces – and, over time, the urgency of all of it pale away.

A nasty second for escalation

Iranian Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei is seen as being in a bind. It’s extensively assumed that he desires to retaliate visibly, not simply to avenge the killing of senior officers but in addition as a result of not doing so would tarnish Iran’s credibility as a regional energy.

However now just isn’t a great time. The area has been aflame for the reason that begin of the Gaza battle, following Hamas’s October 7 assault in Israel, which killed greater than 1,100 Israelis, and the Israeli authorities’s brutal response, which has killed greater than 33,100 Palestinians to this point and pushed Gaza into famine circumstances.

Since October, vicious tit-for-tat violence has raged along the Israel-Lebanon border, there was a protracted string of assaults on US forces in Syria and Iraq, and Crimson Sea transport has been disrupted by Houthi missile and drone strikes.

Though strategies and targets differ from nation to nation, these assaults all get pleasure from Iran’s help and so they all intention to stress Israeli and US leaders to cease the battle in Gaza.

Though Iran could also be prepared to tolerate the chance of an unintentional regional battle, it has repeatedly proven that it doesn’t need direct battle with Israel or the US and can attempt to preserve violence under that threshold.

When Iran-backed teams killed three US soldiers in Jordan earlier this year, Washington retaliated with air assaults on Syria and Iraq.

Tehran appeared to again down: Quds Drive commander Esmail Qaani reportedly informed pro-Iran factions in Iraq to cease focusing on US troops. Since then, they’ve largely been sending drones towards Israel, with little impact.

However failing to reply – or responding solely by means of low-key proxy actions – doesn’t seem to be an possibility for Tehran, on condition that it has publicly dedicated itself to avenging the consulate assault.

Khamenei has said Iran’s “brave men” will punish Israel, considered one of his advisers has warned that Israeli embassies “are now not secure”, and two officers not too long ago informed the New York Occasions they’ll retaliate instantly towards Israel, to revive deterrence.

Failing to reside as much as these public threats may make Iran appear weak within the eyes of associates and foes alike, doubtlessly placing it at an obstacle throughout regional unrest and signalling to Israel that continued escalation carries no value.

Iran is probably going additionally involved that assaults on Iranian high-level officers and state property may turn out to be a standard characteristic of its tit-for-tat battle with Israel, at a really unhealthy second in time.

Conserving battle with Israel and the US beneath management was at all times an essential objective of Iranian overseas coverage. However it’s doubly so now, on condition that probably the most anti-Iranian president in up to date US historical past, Donald Trump, could also be about to reclaim the White Home.

From Tehran’s viewpoint, surrendering management over the escalatory dynamic to Israel simply earlier than the beginning of one other Trump presidency can be very, very unhealthy coverage.

Many choices, all problematic

What to do? Iran has many highly effective proxies and allies within the Center East, however none of them appears nicely positioned to impact a retaliatory motion calibrated to Iran’s issues about longer-term dangers.

The Houthis in Yemen have been waging a extremely profitable marketing campaign towards service provider transport since final yr, utilizing Iranian-supplied arms. However though they’ve additionally proven themselves able to launching high-tech Iranian missiles and drones at southern Israel, these assaults will not be very efficient.

US and European warships have arrange a thick layer of air defences alongside the Crimson Sea, and Israel’s missile defences have been in a position to knock down most of no matter will get by means of that gauntlet.

The Houthis have struggled to hit Israeli territory, and even then it didn’t have an effect on the battle in Gaza or regional dynamics meaningfully. In different phrases, whereas Iran may allow and encourage ramped-up Yemeni strikes, it will in all probability not do a lot to assist it out of its deterrence quandary.

Khamenei’s drawback is that his finest instruments towards Israel are additionally those more than likely to attract a harsh Israeli response and set off uncontrollable escalation – which could finish badly for Iran.

For instance, Iran appears completely able to replaying its 2020 response to the loss of life of Soleimani, by firing a volley of ballistic missiles into Israeli territory.

However even when the affect have been pretty minor – if the missiles crash into the empty desert or detonate with out deaths in an remoted navy facility – a post-October 7 Israel is prone to reply ferociously, doubtlessly overshadowing and nullifying the symbolic affect of Iran’s missile strike. It’s not prone to appear an interesting final result to Iran, on condition that the central plank of its technique has been to keep away from a direct battle.

Retaliating at scale by way of Lebanon is another choice. Iran has spent many years boosting Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal, equipping the group with refined ballistic and cruise missiles, and drones. Most of those precision weapons haven’t been used within the post-October battle, however they’re readily available for any determination to escalate.

Main assaults from Lebanon would, nevertheless, imply taking part in considered one of Hezbollah’s finest playing cards early, and it will additionally run the chance of destabilising an already harmful and fragile state of affairs on the Israel-Lebanon border, which is exactly what Iran and Hezbollah have tried to keep away from.

The thought has been to maintain border violence at a managed simmer since October 2023, as a means of drawing Israeli assets away from Gaza whereas incentivising a conflict-averse US to place a leash on its belligerent Israeli ally.

A significant strike from Lebanon to burnish Iran’s deterrence credentials doesn’t appear appropriate with that type of high-stakes balancing.

The ‘diplomatic possibility’

Iran could attempt to hit Israeli diplomatic amenities, to challenge eye-for-eye retaliation after Israel’s assault on the Damascus consulate. As a precautionary measure, Israel has reportedly shuttered 28 embassies worldwide.

Any Iranian strike on an Israeli diplomatic facility can be unlikely to kill a Zahedi-type safety chief and thus would probably not be akin to Israel’s assault.

However even a minor assault on an Israeli embassy or consulate may assist Iranian leaders argue that they’ve now evened out the rating: you hit our diplomatic amenities, we hit yours.

An assault on a diplomatic facility might be overt, utilizing missiles or drones launched from Iranian territory. It might harm Iran’s relations with the host nation concerned, however relying on which nation that’s, Tehran could also be prepared to just accept some political drama.

Final January, Iran fired ballistic missiles at what it claimed was a Mossad base within the Kurdish area of northern Iraq – with out providing proof – whereas additionally putting unrelated targets in Syria and Pakistan.

It was a wierd, sudden means of lashing out, and it’s not clear that the strikes had any impact aside from demonstrating Iran’s skill to hit distant targets and make itself appear harmful and unpredictable – which can have been the meant impact.

Repeating that strike now can be a low-risk plan of action. Kurdistan Regional Authorities (KRG) authorities are unable to reply in any significant trend and whereas the central authorities in Baghdad may react angrily, the fallout would absolutely be manageable.

Nonetheless, it’s not clear that blowing up one other piece of KRG territory would fulfill these Iranian and Axis hardliners who need to see severe vengeance after Zahedi’s loss of life. In different phrases, even when handy, such an assault won’t be sufficient by itself.

Covert motion – like unclaimed drone strikes, assassinations, or bombings, maybe by way of Hezbollah or another proxy – is another choice. Iran has performed it earlier than and nonetheless stays able to doing it.

Then once more, the much less overt the assault and the longer it takes to execute, the much less it should assist Iran’s deterrence. Whereas killing an Israeli diplomat is perhaps counted as a hit for Iranian leaders, the issue they should clear up is methods to make Israel and others assume twice about bombing Iranian property.

Discuss loudly whereas carrying a small stick

In sum, Iran has sturdy causes to react forcefully to Israel’s Damascus assault – and even stronger causes to be sure that its response just isn’t perceived as too forceful.

Furthermore, it has some ways of attacking Israel, whether or not by means of its personal navy capabilities or semi-covertly by means of the Axis of Resistance community of pro-Iran factions.

And but, the sum of all these elements doesn’t add as much as a lot. None of Iran’s retaliatory choices appears well-adapted to the present state of affairs, wherein the stakes are already uncomfortably excessive because of the Gaza battle.

The out there technique of retaliation will both not generate sufficient symbolic and materials affect to let Khamenei and his cohorts declare they’ve settled the rating – or they’ll, however at the price of uncontrollable and doubtless unacceptable dangers to Iran’s longer-term safety.

It’s seemingly then that Iran must make do with one other underwhelming response or set of responses.

As in 2020, it should then do its finest to patch up the all-too-visible holes in its deterrence posture with fiery rhetoric. No quantity of offended statements can hurt Israel or dissuade it from attacking once more, however they’ll at the least present some non permanent consolation to the Axis of Resistance hardliners.